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Abstract 
A wealth of research in comparative politics and international relations examines how the 
military intervenes in politics via coups. We shift attention to broader forms of military 
involvement in politics (MIP) beyond coups, and claim that terrorist violence and the threat 
of terror attacks provide a window of opportunity for military intervention, without taking 
full control of state institutions. We highlight two mechanisms through which terrorism 
influences MIP: government authorities demand military expertise to fight terrorism and 
strengthen national security and ‘pull’ the armed forces into politics, and state armed actors 
exploit their informational advantage over civilian authorities to ‘push’ their way into politics 
and policy-making. A panel data analysis shows that domestic terror attacks and perceived 
threats from domestic and transnational terrorist organizations increase MIP. We illustrate the 
theoretical mechanisms with the cases of France (1995-98 and 2015-16) and Algeria (1989-
92). 
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Introduction 
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the military has played a far larger role in US politics than 
ever before, leading some experts to talk about an increasing politicization of the US military 
(Owens, 2011; Ulrich and Cook, 2006). Similarly, the French government reinforced military 
means and prerogatives to counter terrorist threats after the terror attacks in Paris and Nice, 
including the deployment of 13,000 troops, an increase in the defense budget and much wider 
autonomy for the military. These examples illustrate greater military intervention in politics 
following terrorist attacks, which in turn can change the civil-military equilibrium, and may 
hinder civilian control over the military and undermine the quality of democracy.  
Surprisingly, previous research has not examined systematically the link between 
terrorism and military involvement in politics (MIP, hereafter). Aksoy et al., (2015) show that 
terrorism increases the probability of coups in autocracies, which is consistent with other 
studies stressing that domestic and external security threats raise the risk of coups (e.g. Ezrow 
and Frantz, 2011; Goemans, 2008; Marinov and Goemans, 2014; Powell, 2012; Svolik, 2013; 
Author, 2015; cfr. Piplani and Talmadge, 2016). However, even though coups marked the 
20th century, these events are rare and affect autocracies disproportionately. More 
importantly, coups represent only one strategy that military actors have at their disposal to 
intervene in politics. To quote Finer (1975:4), “the modes of military intervention are as often 
latent or indirect as they are overt or direct (…) the level to which the military press their 
intervention varies; they do not always supplant the civilian regime. Often, they merely 
substitute one cabinet for another, or again simply subject a cabinet to blackmail”.  
This article focuses on the relationship between terrorism and military intervention in 
politics, beyond coups. Whereas coup plotters seek to obtain power and take over the 
government, we focus on MIP and define it as military actions and processes that fall short of 
an outright attempt to acquire full control of the government and in which the military 
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exercises any kind of political power.2 MIP ranges from coup events to increasing levels of 
military autonomy that often imply greater influence on governments’ decisions in policy 
areas within the defense domain (i.e. military expenditures, the structure and organization of 
the security sector), and sometimes extend to drafting constitutions, redefining justice, and 
appointing specific actors in key state institutions (e.g. Feaver, 1999; Huntington, 1957; Linz 
and Stepan, 1996; Pion-Berlin, 1992). Any such change in MIP is relative to a country-
specific level of involvement that is usually a function of geopolitical, institutional and 
idiosyncratic factors (Brooks, 2008; Levy, 2016) 
Our theory highlights that military actors have motives to intervene in politics and 
their ability to do so depends on the presence of an opportunity structure. To a varying degree 
and extent, military actors generally have incentives to intervene in politics and influence 
policy-making, particularly in defense and foreign policy arenas (Brooks, 2019; Recchia, 
2015; Talmadge, 2015). Because terrorism threatens national security – including a state’s 
population, infrastructure, and sovereignty – and has deep psychological effects among the 
population, civilian authorities use the armed forces to signal their willingness and 
commitment to stop terrorism and secure the country from violence by domestic and 
transnational terrorist organizations. Accordingly, we argue that terror attacks and the threat 
of terrorist violence can open a window of opportunity that facilitates the involvement of 
state armed actors in politics. We argue that an increase in terrorist attacks and/or threat 
violence affects MIP through two different mechanisms: (1) government authorities demand 
military expertise to fight terrorism and strengthen national security and ‘pull’ the military 
into politics, and (2) state armed actors exploit their informational advantage over civilian 
authorities to ‘push’ their way into politics and policy-making. In the empirical analysis, we 
use a global panel data set (1984-2004) and find that domestic terror attacks and perceived 
                                               
2 For further discussions on how we conceptualize MIP please refer to the Appendix, section A. 
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threats from domestic and transnational terrorist organizations increase MIP. We also 
illustrate the causal mechanisms of our theory with the cases of Algeria and France. 
This article adds to the existing literature in two ways. First, we examine how 
terrorism affects a military involvement that can influence government policy, without taking 
direct control of executive power. Theoretically, most previous works focused on coups but 
overlooked that the armed forces often influence policy making via other means. In this way, 
we connect with the qualitative civil-military relations literature and propose a third threat-
based explanation – terrorism – beyond external and internal threats to explain increase in 
MIP.  From a policy perspective, this approach is relevant because related studies show that 
increasing military involvement in politics can affect civilian control over the military, and 
ultimately undermine democratic institutions and the quality of democracy (e.g., Karl, 1990; 
Linz and Stepan, 1996; Pion-Berlin, 1992; Wagstaff, 2013) 
 
Previous Research 
The civil-military relations’ paradox is as theoretically simple as politically crucial: state 
armed actors in command of state survival and national security have the muscle to prey on 
society, influence the policy-making process, and remove executive authorities by force or 
the threat of force. To quote Feaver (1999:214), “[b]ecause the military must face enemies, it 
must have coercive power, the ability to force its will on others. But coercive power often 
gives it the capability to enforce its will on the community that created it”. An extensive 
literature has analyzed the conditions under which military actors intervene in politics and 
how civilians can maintain control over the armed forces. Interestingly, research traditions 
differ in the kind of military participation in politics they have focused on, and both cross-
national and case-based studies have neglected whether and how terrorism affects such 
involvement.      
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Cross-national research shows that internal and interstate wars and popular unrest 
often motivate coups (Bell and Sudduth, 2017; Goemans, 2008, Bove and Rivera, 2015). 
Other studies examine the causes of coups in autocracies, helping to understand how different 
conflicting dynamics between regimes and opposition actors within and outside the ruling 
elite motivate military actors to use force or the threat of force against dictators (e.g., Aksoy 
et al., 2012; Svolik, 2013). Yet most studies overlook that state armed actors can intervene in 
politics in many ways, and that coups are only one strategy to influence government 
policies.3 As Feaver (1999:216) puts it, “even if a society achieves adequate levels of 
assurance against utter collapse at either extreme, battlefield defeat and coup, there is a range 
of problematic activities in which the military can engage [...] Thus, ‘solving’ the problem of 
coups does not neutralize the general problem of control on an ongoing basis”. 
Case-based research highlights that the military not only intervenes in politics via 
coups, suggesting that military actors have several degrees of institutional autonomy and 
influence military spending, the organization of the security sector, as well as defense and 
foreign policies more widely (e.g., Finer, 1975; Huntington, 1957; Levy, 2016; Pion-Berlin, 
1992; White, 2017). Gelpi and Feaver (2002) find that the presence of veterans in the U.S. 
political elite – their proxy for the civil-military gap over time and the prevalence of military 
experience and opinions – reduces the propensity of the U.S. to initiate militarized disputes. 
“Once a dispute has been initiated, however, the higher the proportion of veterans, the greater 
the level of force the United States will use in the dispute” (Gelpi and Feaver, 2002:779). 
Similarly, Flynn (2014) shows that military actors occupying key positions within the U.S. 
government shape defense spending priorities in favor of their respective branches (Flynn, 
2014). Other studies likewise suggest that the army retained important influence on many 
civilian governments after democratic transitions, underlining that military actors imposed 
                                               
3 An exception is White (2017), who shows that defeats or stalemates in international crises can increase 
military professionalization that in turn reduce military intervention in politics. 
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“reserved domains” to maintain control on relevant policy-making processes (e.g., Linz and 
Stepan 1996; Pion-Berlin 1992). Recent literature points to “the existence of unofficial loci of 
power within military organizations” (Hundman and Parkinson, 2019: 20) 
While existing research has made progress in explaining MIP, our review suggests 
that the literature has several limitations. Cross-national studies have largely focused on 
coups, without exploring MIP beyond coups. In turn, case studies have shown that MIP can 
take many shapes and that the military can influence policy-making processes without 
perpetrating a coup. Yet there is still a lack of comparative research on broader forms of MIP. 
Finally, within either research tradition, the potential role of terrorism for military 
participation has been largely overlooked. A partial exception is Aksoy et al’s study (2015) 
on terrorism and coups in autocracies,4 but we still know little about whether and how 
terrorist activity affects other forms of military intervention. 
 
The Argument 
We analyze civil-military relations through the lenses of the principal-agent theory, with 
political authorities seen as principals and the armed forces as agents (Feaver, 2009; Svolik, 
2013). We argue that a set of actors’ motives and an opportunity structure shape a civil-
military relations equilibrium. A first set of motives to intervene in politics stems from the 
military view of its role as guardian of the state. The military’s raison d’être is to protect the 
state from violent direct action by domestic and foreign actors like insurgent armies and rival 
states. As Huntington (1957: 63) puts it, “the responsibility of the [military] profession is to 
enhance the military security of the state”. A second set of motives is linked with the 
corporate interests of the military. The bureaucratic politics theory depicts policymaking as 
                                               
4 Aksoy et al., (2015: 423) find that terrorist attacks increase the likelihood of “reshuffling coups” – those “that 
reshuffle the leader but leave the regime intact” –, although do not affect coups that replace “the group of elite 
atop the regime”. 
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the product of multiple interactions between competing interest groups (Halperin, 1974). The 
timing and content of policy decisions are shaped by officials’ efforts to protect or promote 
their interests and overstate their own priorities in competition with other agencies. Like 
other government entities, the military strives to protect or extend its operational autonomy 
and advance its own ends (Allison and Halperin, 1972). Unsurprisingly, the surge of 
terrorism over the last decades has led military actors in many countries to emphasize the 
threats posed by terrorist groups and highlight their role in protecting the state from terrorism. 
Beyond motives, an opportunity structure that facilitates intervention and increases 
military autonomy in policy-making is also necessary (Finer, 1975).5 Military actors have the 
power and capabilities to enforce their will and remove executive leaders using violence, 
although a large proportion of coups are bloodless and do not require the use of violence 
(Powell and Thyne, 2011: 251; Singh, 2014). However, coups can be costly and military 
actors do not always have incentives to seize power through the use of force or threat thereof. 
Indeed, military forces often refrain from using force against political leaders because of the 
fear that political factionalism could provoke divisions within the army (Nordlinger, 1977).6 
Unlike coups, other forms of intervention require a context or conditions – an opportunity 
structure – facilitating participation in politics by the armed forces. In the remainder, we 
detail how terrorist attacks and/or the threat of terrorism provide such opportunity structure, 
which makes intervention in policy making more likely. 
 
Terrorism as a security threat 
Much research highlights that the armed forces are the sentinels of the state and that civil and 
international wars severely threaten the territorial integrity of the state and the national 
                                               
5 Our view on opportunity structures draws directly on the literature on contentious politics (e.g., Lichbach 
1998). Moreover, our discussion on opportunity structures resembles Finer’s “calculus of intervention” (Finer 
1975: 83).  
6 Consistent with this, Marinov and Goemans (2014) find that most coups that occurred after the Cold War were 
followed by competitive elections since coup leaders stayed in the barracks after leadership removal. 
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interest. Threat-based explanations stress that domestic and external security threats affect 
civil-military relations and encourage military participation in politics to a different extent 
(Huntington, 1957; Lasswell, 1941; White, 2017). The general consensus in the civil-military 
literature is that overall external threats should decrease MIP, while higher internal threats 
should lead to higher levels of MIP (Desch, 2001; Piplani and Talmadge, 2016; Staniland, 
2008:326-27). High levels of internal threat may lead to what Stepan labels “new 
professionalism”, one in which the military have an expanded and more politicized role 
(Stepan, 1973: 1978). Consistently, recent work finds that civil wars make coups more likely, 
while international conflicts less likely (Bell and Sudduth, 2017; Piplani and Talmadge, 
2016).  
Along similar lines to Stepan’s (1978) work on domestic insurgency, we focus on 
terrorism as a security threat. We contend that terrorism threaten a state’s population, 
infrastructure, and sovereignty. Terrorism delivers a message beyond its immediate targets 
and victims, with significant psychological effects among the population. It represents a 
violent tactic intentionally devised by individuals or subnational groups to achieve a specific 
goal, based on intimidating and terrorizing a wider audience beyond its direct victims 
(Krueger and Malečková, 2003). Terrorism pursues a range of goals, including government 
and regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and maintenance of the 
status quo, among other areas (Kydd and Walter, 2002). It is a form of “coordinated 
destruction” that often hinders a state’s national security (Tilly 2003:14, quoted in Sambanis 
2008: 178) and it has significant detrimental effects on the target state’s economy and 
political stability (Sandler, 2014). 
Terrorism – most notably after 9/11 – constitutes a major concern for national and 
international security policies (Mueller and Stewart, 2012). In the U.S., the Bush 
Administration considered terrorism as a primary threat to national security: “Given the 
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potential catastrophic consequences of terrorist attacks employing weapons of mass 
destruction, Administration decision-makers felt that the nation could not afford to sit back, 
wait for attacks to occur, and then respond. The nation was mobilized; combating terrorism 
and crippling Al Qaeda became top national priorities” (Pearl, 2007). Similarly, after the 
2015 Paris attacks, François Hollande declared “France is at war”7 and the Prime Minister 
Manuel Valls warned “the European project can die very soon if we are not able to respond to 
security challenges and not giving ourselves the means to fight terrorism”.8 This mechanism 
is not unique to advanced democracies; for example, in recent years the militant Islamist 
terrorist group Boko Haram has spread terror in Nigeria and other African countries, forcing 
authorities to declare three northern Nigerian states in a state of emergency and declare war 
against terrorism.9 We acknowledge that these declarations and statements might be strategic 
and can be used instrumentally for attaining particular political objectives, but they suggest 
how terrorism might create openings for an increase in MIP. 
 
Terrorism and MIP 
We argue that terrorist violence and terrorist threats provide a window of opportunity, and 
thus we expect to see an increase in MIP as a result of an increase in terrorism and perceived 
threats. We highlight two analytically distinct but empirically intertwined mechanisms 
through which terrorism can increase levels of MIP, which we label ‘pushing’ and ‘pulling’.10 
A first mechanism is that political authorities pull the armed forces into politics. The 
“management of violence” is the hallmark of military actors and their technical expertise and 
skills distinguish them from any other actors from within society (Lasswell 1941). 
Importantly, under contexts of political violence by terrorist groups or when the perceived 
                                               
7 https://goo.gl/N8sWrB 
8 https://goo.gl/1ZHtUy 
9 https://goo.gl/UuabX1 
10 Note that our pushing and pulling mechanisms differ substantively from (Thompson, 1977). 
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threat is high, government authorities have incentives to demand the knowledge and skills of 
the specialists of violence, and both the principal and the agent share preferences about the 
need of a more active role in policy-making by the armed forces. Military actors find 
themselves with the opportunity to influence policy-making processes without the use of 
force and can do so because civilian authorities demand military actors’ expertise to 
strengthen national security.  
Civilian leaders under security threat environments are frequently dependent on 
military actors’ information and capacity to prevent violent threats and strengthen the 
security of the state.11 Consequently, state armed actors in the face of terrorist violence can 
acquire significant political autonomy and influence decision-making processes. The negative 
externalities of terrorism on a leader’s survival and increasing popular support for military-
oriented counterterrorism policies generate strong pressures for civilian authorities to provide 
the military with additional powers to fight terrorism, facilitating state armed actors to 
increase their autonomy vis-à-vis civilian authorities. Put differently, political authorities 
often consider the risks and costs of terrorism and they frequently demand the expertise of 
military actors who then increase their involvement in politics and intervene in policy-
making, following their own organizational interests.  
A second mechanism involves the military pushing its way into politics. Under some 
environments, government authorities have different policy preferences than the military, but 
the military has strong incentives to intervene. The military expertise with an informational 
advantage over the principal combined with the principal’s inability to systematically assess 
insecurity environments may allow the military to take actions that increase their degree of 
                                               
11 Non-military actors, such as intelligence agencies and the police, also participate in governments’ responses 
to terrorism, but this does not necessarily reduce opportunities for greater military involvement. While military 
actors may be ill-suited or ineffective (Carey et al., 2016; Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Pilster et al., 2014), in 
practice they are still widely used, even in countries in which the military are reluctantly used domestically, 
such as in Italy (Operation Safe Road), the United Kingdom (in the aftermath of the Westminster and the 
Manchester attack in 2017). It is all the more surprising that the military is used in this function, despite not 
being the main agency in charge in fighting terrorism domestically. See for instance: https://goo.gl/toqbS7  
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involvement in politics (Finer 1975: 74). Military actors are not only the experts on violence, 
but they also have a strong comparative advantage regarding intelligence capacity, 
information gathering about security threats, including threats from terrorist groups, as well 
as coercive capacity. Politicians rely on military intelligence and information acquisition 
capacity to define specific threats, as well as coordinate and implement policies aimed at 
reinforcing homeland security. Because the principal’s decisions largely depend on the 
agents’ knowledge and many of the actions of the agents (the military) are hidden from the 
principal (political authorities), state armed actors can easily exploit this informational 
asymmetry to shape a government’s decisions and advance their own views about how to 
respond to terrorism.12 
Military actors often overstate the risk of conflict and the threats posed by competing 
polities and rival actors, including terrorist groups. To a varying degree and different effects, 
the armed forces not only draw attention to the constant presence of violent threats, but also 
underline the degree and proximity of these threats (Brooks, 2008; Feaver, 2009; Levy, 2012; 
Staniland, 2008). They normally “stress the continuing nature of the threats to the security of 
the state and the continuing likelihood of war”, as well as “emphasize the magnitude and 
immediacy of the security threats” (Huntington 1957: 65). Shortly after becoming the Chief 
of Staff of the U.S. Army in 2015, for example, General Mark Milley continued emphasizing 
the threat of terrorism and the need to “sustain counterterrorist and counterinsurgency 
capabilities”.13 Importantly, the emphasis on terrorist threats has become increasingly 
common due to the use of terrorist tactics in civil wars and rival states’ support for terrorist 
groups (Asal et al., 2012). 
 
                                               
12 We do not imply that the military can always credibly overemphasize the threat of terrorism, but it is plausible 
to think that overemphasis on the terrorist threat is more credible not only for politicians but also for larger 
segments of the population in states where terror attacks have occurred, or in countries with neighbors that have 
experienced terrorist violence. 
13 https://goo.gl/KqkQX7 
 12 
Hypotheses 
Our argument leads to a number of observable implications about the effects of terrorism on 
MIP. As discussed above, terrorist violence facilitates state armed actors to get involved in 
domestic politics and influence a state’s policy in different areas. So far, however, we have 
not made any distinction between domestic and transnational terrorism. Without denying 
differences about the nature of domestic and transnational terrorism that are likely to have 
implications to explain other outcomes (Savun and Phillips, 2009), we expect the same effect 
of domestic and transnational terrorist violence on MIP. The main difference between these 
forms of terrorist violence is related to nationalities of the perpetrators and the victims.  In 
fact, whereas domestic terrorism includes perpetrators, targets, victims and audiences in the 
same state, while transnational terrorism involves actors from different states (Enders et al., 
2011). Our general argument should apply equally to both, largely because domestic and 
transnational terrorist violence hinder homeland security and provide military actors with 
opportunities to intervene and influence policy-making, without taking direct control of 
executive power. We summarize this reasoning in Hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Domestic and transnational terror attacks increase military involvement 
in politics. 
 
 
 
Military actors do not only consider observed episodes of domestic and transnational 
terrorism. Nordhaus et al. (2012) point out that the risk of fighting in an international war 
affects a state’s military spending. They estimate the ex-ante probability that a state will 
become involved in an international war and show that the threat of an international war 
increases military expenditures. Accordingly, we argue that civilian authorities and military 
actors also consider the ex-ante probability that the state will be the target of a terrorist group. 
The armed forces do not only want to reduce the repercussions of terrorist violence once it 
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occurs, but to prevent any potential terrorist event. Furthermore, intelligence gathering and 
counterterrorist strategies are severely limited by the “clandestine and opaque nature of 
terrorism and terrorist threats” (Conrad et al., 2014), leading military actors to magnify the 
risks of potential terror attacks due to the lack of information about the strength and purposes 
of terrorist organizations. Unsurprisingly, for example, “[d]uring the height of the Iraq War, 
US government sources frequently cited the lack of information about the terrorist groups as 
a key reason for the persistence of the terrorist threats” (Conrad et al. 2014:3). This reasoning 
leads to Hypothesis 2:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The threat of domestic and transnational terrorism increases military 
involvement in politics. 
 
 
Illustrative Examples: France and Algeria 
We now examine two examples to illustrate and elucidate the mechanisms highlighted in our 
theory. We selected two cases with a different baseline level of MIP: France – a democracy 
with a solid and well-established norm of civilian control of the military, which should stay 
out of politics- and Algeria – an authoritarian regime in which the military has influenced 
politics through both violent and non-violent means since independence.14 While both cases 
are characterized by an increase in MIP, they illustrate the two mechanisms of the theory. 
While France helps illustrate both ‘pushing’ (1997-98) ‘pulling’ (2015-16), Algeria illustrates 
our ‘pushing’ mechanism (1989-92). 
  
France  
                                               
14 See the Online Appendix, Section C for further detail on case selection and Table C2 and C3 for the values of 
the index over time for France and Algeria. 
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As in many democracies, French civil-military relations display professional armed forces 
respectful of civilian control (Vennesson, 2003). Unlike other democracies, however, the 
French military organization has traditionally displayed low degrees of military autonomy 
(Irondelle, 2008). Known as la grande muette [the big silent one], the French military has 
been careful to avoid any kind of political statement in public since De Gaulle’s strong 
reaffirmation of the norm of civilian control in 1962, a result of the progressive disbandment 
of the French officers’ corps after World War II which culminated in the 1961 failed putsch 
in Algiers (Ruffa 2017: 404; Alexander and Bankwitz, 1994). Traditionally concerned with 
external operations, the French military can be asked to intervene in domestic contexts in 
exceptional circumstances.15 Since the 1970s, France developed a judicial approach to 
counter-terrorism, preferring the use of judges over the one of the military, which 
traditionally played a marginal role in the fight against terrorism (Guittet, 2008).16  
Pushing (1995-1998): Between 1995 and 1998, we observe in our data an increase in 
terrorist attacks and threats in France, among others the attack at St. Michel RER station, the 
one at the Port-Royal metro station and the killing of Préfet Erignac in Corsica. At the same 
time, the ICRG score of military involvement in politics (on a scale between 0 and 6) 
increased from 1.1 in 1995 to 1.9 in 1997 and then to 2.1 in 1998, which is an unusually high 
increase in an advanced democracy. 
In February 1996, President Chirac announced the end of conscription and a set of 
profound transformations towards a smaller, more agile and technologically advanced 
professional military, which would have substantially reduced the military’s budget and its 
autonomy.17 This triggered widespread discontent and concern among the military (Rigouste, 
                                               
15 Those circumstance are the ‘state of emergency’, ‘state of siege’ or under a ‘particular menace’ as mentioned 
in Article 16 and Article 36 of the French Constitution.  
16 Namely, the Directorate for Defense Protection and Security, the Directorate for Military Intelligence, and the 
General Directorate for External Security. On the ground, the military deploys either the Army or the 
Gendarmerie, which are both services of the French armed forces. 
17 https://goo.gl/N5m9S8; https://goo.gl/5rR4Ht 
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2014). Unseen for decades in the French context, the military reacted publicly and 
highlighted systematically the terrorist threat to argue against budgetary cuts, ‘pushing’ to 
defend their interests and autonomy (Irondelle, 2008). Between 1996 and 1998, several high-
ranking officers published a series of interviews with the press, explicitly linking the 
increased terrorist threat with the need of making greater use of the military, Gendarmerie 
and army in particular both abroad and internally.18 For instance, General Henri Paris wrote 
that any outbreak of violence would require the use of the armed forces, instead of the police, 
to take care of the raised terrorist threat (Paris, 1998). Other officers called for strengthening 
the Vigipirate program with a more extensive use of the Army and the Gendarmerie to “fight 
terrorists with military means”.19 Moreover, some officials questioned the decision to cut the 
military budget because it hindered the military capacity to prevent and fight terrorism.20 To 
quote a retired Army General: “1996-98 was a messy time in which we tried to show the 
importance of the military for anti-terrorist purposes because we did not want to end up being 
micro-managed as in UN peacekeeping missions and we wanted to contain the budgetary 
cuts”.21 This ended in the unique gesture of the Chief of Army General Mercier to release an 
interview with Le Monde, in which he argued against budgetary cuts (Inciyan, 1997).22 
This ‘pushing’ of the military in a democracy is successful only when the opportunity 
structure allows for it. Before the increase in the terrorist threat in 1996, the opportunity 
structure was severely constrained: the French defense budget had declined continuously and 
the decision to end conscription was part of the process of reducing the military, foreseeing 
the cutting down of more than 2,000 workplaces. Even the conservative government were 
pursuing a cut down of the relative role of the military (Daho, 2017; Irondelle, 2011). The 
increase in terrorism in 1995 changed the pre-existing opportunity structure since the military 
                                               
18 https://goo.gl/ogQSPt; https://goo.gl/T76tPN.  
19 https://goo.gl/uqL6nG; as well Author interview with Expert 2 
20 https://goo.gl/uTBuwK 
21 Authors interview with Expert 2 
22 https://goo.gl/n7jeuG 
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could justify its claim against budget cuts, and by making it more attractive for politicians to 
increase the military’s role (and budget) and signaling a focus on security to voters, which 
was reflected in parliamentary debates in both chambers.23  
Chirac and Prime Minister Millon responded strongly to terrorism, endorsing a 
militarized approach, which is reflected in an increase in our data: France launched operation 
Vigipirate at the second highest alert level, delayed its entrance into Schengen by more than a 
year, deployed the highest amount of gendarmerie and army ever mobilized domestically 
until then.24 This strategy continued and increased after the advent of the cohabitation 
between the conservative pro-military President Chirac and the socialist Prime Minister 
Jospin, traditionally pacifist and critical towards the military, which lead to the second 
increase in 1998 (Dionet, 2004:145). Against all odds, Jospin in 1996 radically transformed 
his party’s stance and transitioned to tougher views on the fight against terrorism, which 
became one of the core tenets during his time as Prime Minister.25 Chirac and Millon, and 
even Jospin, were all perceived to be extremely close to the military between 1996 and 1998 
(Gregory, 2000).26 The military used the psychological power of terrorist threat as opposed to 
other motives to increase their relative autonomy (Inciyan, 1997; Isnard, 1999). A retired 
French General summarizes the motives behind these policies: “politicians felt pressed to 
show solidarity with the military given the tough time”.27 
The new opportunity structure emerging from increasing terrorist threats and voters’ 
security concerns together with the lobbying by the military led to policies that increased 
military’s autonomy.28 In a first phase, budget cuts were stopped and all services were 
                                               
23 https://goo.gl/CiSGCi; https://goo.gl/7nWZ6i 
24 https://goo.gl/P4VNVC 
25 https://goo.gl/zhTHFo; https://goo.gl/Kg7HEk 
26 https://goo.gl/H3k9cu 
27 Authors interview with expert 9 
28 https://goo.gl/jqBSeH 
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involved in a wide range of internal counter-terrorist activities.29 In particular, the 
Gendarmerie was given much ampler power, which triggered a heated debate with the 
police.30 In an interview, the Defense Minister defended the Gendarmes’ more assertive role 
reminding the public that they were not supposed to tend cows but protect French citizens 
against terrorists.31 In a second phase, from 1998 terrorist attacks declined but the military 
budget did not decrease and the role of the military for internal security increased even 
further, including for the first time the monitoring of sensitive sites by the military in the 
entire territory.32 Jospin’s Defense Minister Richard claimed that the military were opening a 
second front at home with their wider influence also in domestic affairs.33 Many experts 
regretted the dangers of a ‘militarized security’ control internally.34   
Pulling (2015- 2016): In a situation where President Hollande’s popular support was 
at an all-time low in 2015, the terrorist attacks against Charlie Hebdo, Bataclan and Stade de 
France (2015) and Nice (2016) changed the opportunity structure by giving him the 
possibility to obtain “a flair of energetic statesman posture”35 through tough internal security 
measures (Rigouste, 2014). Accordingly, the president argued that “the country was at war” 
and mobilized the Gendarmes, the military and the reserve in operation “Sentinel”.36  More 
than 13,000 troops were deployed domestically – of which 6,000 only in the Paris region –, 
amounting to 12 percent of the army’s active duty members and making it the largest 
domestic operation ever launched in France (Tenenbaum, 2016). The so-called “most 
warrior-like President of the 5th Republic”, Hollande gave prominence to the military’s role 
not only by launching a domestic operation but also by systematically choosing to convey the 
                                               
29 https://goo.gl/gTkhAK 
30 https://goo.gl/jqBSeH; https://goo.gl/zzQ22u 
31 https://goo.gl/dFPkqS 
32 https://goo.gl/FZYtru 
33 https://goo.gl/7nWZ6i 
34 https://goo.gl/gTkhAK 
35 https://goo.gl/z4zz8W 
36 https://goo.gl/gTkhAK 
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Defense Council over the Internal Security Council and by reinforcing military operations 
abroad. The combined effect lead to an increase in military autonomy.  
Already over-stretched with several military operations abroad, however, the military 
establishment reacted critically to Hollande’s decision to launch operation Sentinel and the 
military was reluctant to assume this role and remained skeptical.37 Nevertheless, Sentinel 
progressively increased its autonomy along several dimensions, including an increase by 15% 
of the French operational force, which had remained frozen since 2002; an increase in tactical 
autonomy, including the right of the army to conduct inspections and use force in the street;38 
and an increased access to the president who meets high-level officers of the Joint Chief of 
Staff every seven days, instead of the usual meeting every 41 days.39 This increased 
autonomy was confirmed by the fact that the Ministry of Interior became “increasingly 
jealous of its prerogatives” and was reluctant to share information with those in charge of 
operation Sentinel.40 Likewise, when Hollande mobilized the reserve he maintained the same 
regimental structure, which allows the military to maintain more autonomy.41 Importantly, 
both the military and gendarmes were provided with some of the judiciary police function, a 
decision considered to be highly controversial.42 Aware of the increased autonomy, the newly 
elected President proceeded to change the organizational structure to increase control.43 
Finally, Sentinel greatly improved recruitment rates and the legitimacy of the military to 
exceptionally high levels, and surveys suggest that the French public felt reassured by the 
                                               
37 https://goo.gl/iQbkEm. At lower levels of the military echelons, soldiers also voiced their distress and how 
“they are very tired of this”, denouncing the limited turnover, the demanding shifts and the low morale 
(Tenenbaum 2016: 38). 
38 https://goo.gl/rqd5s8. 
39 Authors interview with Expert 1. 
40 https://goo.gl/Rh3mAa, in particular passage 8:12-8:43 (2nd part of the program). 
41 https://goo.gl/g5QaAx 
42 https://goo.gl/FZ9FWQ; https://goo.gl/k6KsoJ 
43 https://goo.gl/QYS5tu 
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military presence.44 Thus, a reluctant military was ‘pulled’ into politics and found itself with 
increased autonomy, resources and bargaining power. 45   
Taking both phases together, while still clearly operating within the boundaries of 
civilian control, terrorism seems to have increased MIP in the French case via the ‘pushing’ 
(1996-98) and the ‘pulling’ (2015-16) mechanism, respectively. In both phases, the French 
military increased its degree of autonomy and indirectly influenced political decisions. 
 
Algeria (1989-92) 
 
We now turn to the case of Algeria. Before the military entered violently into Algerian 
politics with the 1992 coup, we observe a period (1989-92) with an increase in both our 
terrorism index and our ICRG indicator. The Algerian military ‘pushed’ for increasing its 
involvement in politics and overemphasized the threat posed by the terrorist attacks that 
occurred between 1989-92, but avoided a coup until 1992 (Aït-Aoudia, 2015).46 
For thirty years, the military constituted the backbone of support to the Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN), the single dominant ruling party and was considered the 
“arbiter” (Lenze, 2016:38) or the “real power” (Cook, 2007: 27) in Algeria. The military 
directly chose the President and had informal veto power in many other political decisions 
(Lahouari 2002, cited in Lutterbeck, 2012:31). The military traditionally oversaw the political 
process from the background through informal influence (Aït-Aoudia, 2015; Martínez 2000, 
48-51).47  
                                               
44 https://goo.gl/Rh3mAa. 
45  https://goo.gl/RpZL5hi; https://goo.gl/YNAxAb. At the end of this process, the Joint Chief of Staff de 
Villiers resigned in July 2017. While this could be interpreted as a ‘pushing’ move, most observers argue that it 
was in fact Macron to ask for his resignation (https://goo.gl/n4ddX7 as well as https://goo.gl/y9pzRq). It seems 
that the Macron’s pulling of the military in politics is not deemed to stop anytime soon:  https://goo.gl/ZXPQbM 
46 Also confirmed by Expert 2. 
47 Still, the various Constitutional Charters from independence until 1989 formally endowed “the military with a 
role in the development of the country” (see Algeria Constitutional Charter 1976). For instance, the decision to 
elect Chadli Benjedid in 1979 as President is unanimously recognized as a choice of the military (Martínez, 
2000). 
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From the mid-80s, when oil revenues and support to the FLN declined, the political situation 
in Algeria started to change (Entelis 1992:46). The government attempted to address some of 
the public’s concerns through economic reforms and eventually conceded political reforms, 
including a new constitution that allowed the formation of political associations. Just two 
weeks after its approval in 1989, the Islamist movement founded the Front Islamique du Salut 
(FIS) and the masses took to the street to show their support for the democratization process 
and the FIS. The Constitution also limited for the first time the power of the military and 
removed the clause acknowledging the role of the military in the development of the country. 
Facing a threat to its own power position and its role as defender of stability, the military 
promptly reacted and pushed to increase its involvement in politics. Alongside the violent 
repression of mass protests (Martínez, 2000), the military used systematically the surge of 
terrorist attacks occurred from 1989 until the coup in 1992 as a justification for its increasing 
interference in politics.48 Both in the public and military press such as El Djeich, the military 
explicitly connected their prominent role in defending Algerian democracy to specific 
terrorist attacks. To illustrate, in June 1989 in Ouargla, a child died when a band of criminal 
burned down a house. This event was immediately labeled as terrorism by the military 
establishment and connected to the strong need to defend democracy and political stability 
(Lahouari, 2002). A few weeks after this event, the Parliament approved the state security 
court regime and shortly thereafter in early 1990, the state of siege, entailing severe 
restrictions to the right of association and imposing a curfew.49 
As early as 1989, high-ranking officers and politicians with a military background started 
issuing more explicit political statements, portraying the military as the defenders of the 
                                               
48 Aksoy et al., (2012: 822) report 31 terrorist attacks within this period. 
49 The Cour de sûreté de l'État is an extreme measure allowing ampler margins of maneuver to the military in 
terms of search operations and pre-emptive detention (see e.g., Martínez 2000, 73-76). 
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country against a terrorist insurgency (Martínez, 2000: 164-67).50  For instance, the minister 
of national defense, Major General Khaled Nezzar, supported the military’s resolve to 
‘‘respond to any organized excesses that might jeopardize the national unity of the country 
(…) [and] would not hesitate to intervene to re-establish order and unity so that force remains 
in the hands of the law” (Nezzar, 1999).  
In line with its traditional hands-off approach, the military initially remained ambivalent 
towards FIS and its leader Abassi, even after FIS won the local elections in 1990 and the first 
round of national elections in 1991. But when Abassi started to be more openly critical 
towards the military in early 1991 and it became clear that FIS was negotiating a deal with 
the President for limiting the military’s influence, the military became critical and verbally 
aggressive against FIS.51 A key member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Chelloufi, 
reacted very strongly: ‘‘I will not be tolerant of those who use democracy in order to return to 
dictatorship once they have achieved power’’ (Cook, 2007: 53).   
In addition to overemphasizing the terrorist threat in general, and the narrative connecting 
terrorists with the military role as defender of stability, from June 1991, the military linked all 
terrorist attacks to the FIS.52 For instance, when the commander of an army brigade in 
Cheraga was killed and shortly thereafter a policeman was kidnapped and then murdered in 
Lakhdaria by what was allegedly a criminal group, the military reaction was strong and 
accused again “terrorists from within the country, who threaten to weaken our values and our 
democracy”.53  Similarly, when in November 1991, the jihadist group lead by Tayeb El-
Afghani launched an attack killing eight militaries, the military connected it to FIS 
contentious strategies. At that time, the military argued that the military response was 
                                               
50 Military officers expressed their views in the army magazine El Djeich, reprinted in major Algerian 
newspapers such as El Watan (Aït-Aoudia 2015; Lenze, 2016). 
51 Author interview with Expert 4. 
52 Author interview with Expert 3. 
53 Op-Ed, El Djeich, July 1991. 
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absolutely necessary for defending the country from subversive groups.54 Eventually, 
however, the military used violent coercion to contain the rise of the FIS: it cancelled the 
second round of voting, annulled the first round, Benjedid was removed from office and, 
shortly after, the FIS was declared illegal.  
In sum, the case of Algeria between 1989 and 1992 illustrates nicely the ‘pushing’ 
mechanism of our theory on MIP. First, the Algerian military systematically overemphasized 
terrorist attacks and threats to justify their autonomy and disseminated a narrative that 
portrayed them as the guardian of the state against those who destabilized the country with 
terrorist means. Second, it linked its most prominent political enemy to this terrorist threat. In 
both phases, terrorism was crucial to justify the military pushing its way into politics. Taken 
together, the illustrative examples from France and Algeria shed light on our mechanisms. 
 
  
 
Data 
We assess our hypotheses using subjective and objective data of MIP for all independent 
states from 1984 to 2004. These measures are regressed against observed domestic and 
transnational terror attacks and our estimations of the ex-ante probability of domestic and 
transnational terror events, along with a set of controls. 
 
Dependent variables 
We use an indicator for military in politics from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), a system based on a set of 22 components grouped into three major risk categories: 
political, financial, and economic. Political risk comprises 12 components. We use the 
                                               
54 Author interview with expert 3. 
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military in politics component, classified on a scale between 0 and 6.55 The assessments are 
made by ICRG editors based on subjective analysis of the available information on each 
country, and are informed by a range of criteria, such as the size of the military, spending and 
budget levels, the participation of the military in the executive and legislative branches/orders 
of government, a country’s democratic tradition, and a country’s democratic traditions, 
among others. These values are based on several pre-set questions to ensure consistency 
between countries and over time (Howell and Llewellyn, 2011).56 ICRG risk subcomponents 
have been extensively employed in many studies in political science, economics and finance 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001; Bove and Nisticò, 2014; Dreher et al., 2017; Pinkowitz et al., 2006). 
This is a reliable measure for the analysis at hand. Consider, for example, one democracy, 
South Korea, and one dictatorship, Indonesia. South Korea embarked on a stable democratic 
transition in the 1980s, following a military dictatorship. Yet the country has never been 
completely immune from a degree of military interference in politics. During the Chun 
Doohwan administration (1981-1988), 8.7% of the members of the National Assembly and 
20.8% of the members of the government had a military background, whereas the Roh Tae-
woo administration (1988-1993) saw these shares slightly decreasing to 5% and 18.5%, 
respectively (Saxer, 2004). The average level of military involvement in politics was 3.9 out 
of 6 throughout this period, while it peaked 4.2 in 2004. According to Saxer (2004), in this 
period 32% of the members of the National Defense Committee in the National Assembly 
were former military officers and President Roh Moo-hyun’s first defense minister was a 
former general. Similarly, during the final years of the authoritarian government in Indonesia, 
President Suharto employed about 14,000 officers outside the armed forces. In fact, about 
                                               
55 The decomposition of the standard deviation of military in politics into between and within components 
shows that the former is 1.6 and the latter is 0.9, suggesting that this measure varies between countries and over 
time within them. This variable is unambiguous i.e., higher values unequivocally translate into higher degrees of 
military involvement and thus allows comparison across countries and over time.  
56 We have reversed its original value to facilitate interpretation of coefficients; hence, higher values indicate 
higher levels of MIP.  
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50% of the provincial governors and over 30% of district heads had military backgrounds 
(Clear, 2005). Indonesia’s ICRG score is between 5 and 6, higher than some archetypical 
military dictatorships in Guatemala (between 4.2 and 4.8) or Niger (between 3.2 and 4.2) in 
the same period. 
 
Key independent variables 
For our main independent variables, we use information on terrorist incidents from the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD), distinguished between domestic and transnational 
terrorist events (Enders et al., 2011). Terrorism is defined as “the premeditated use or threat 
to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants to obtain a 
political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the 
immediate victims” (Ibid., 321). As discussed above, we expect military involvement to be 
affected by domestic terror attacks, in which the venue, target, and perpetrators are all from 
the same country, as well as by transnational terrorist events, involving victims and 
perpetrators of different nationalities and/or crossing interstate borders (Ibid.). We employ 
counts of all terror attacks - domestic and transnational - and assess whether there are 
substantive differences between these two types of terrorism. Data on the occurrence of 
transnational terrorist incidents are taken from the International Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorist Events (ITERATE) Database (Mickolus et al., 2007).57 
 Our second hypothesis relates perceived terrorist threats and the risk of MIP. 
Following Nordhaus, Oneal and Russett (2012), we estimate the ex ante probability of 
                                               
57 For transnational terrorism, we use ITERATE rather than GTD for two reasons. First, ITERATE uses a 
consistent coding method over the period under study, and thus “it is likely to capture the general movements in 
the number of transnational incidents more accurately than GTD” (Enders et al. 2011: 324). For transnational 
terrorism, we follow Gelpi and Avdan (2018), which transforms ITERATE into directed dyad year cases, and 
consider transnational terrorism when it involves citizens of more than one country. 
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domestic terror attacks to capture a “threat perception effect”.58 We build on Wilson and 
Piazza (2013) to calculate the prospective probability that a country will become the target of 
domestic terrorism. Wilson and Piazza model domestic terrorism as a function of democracy, 
the gross national income per capita, population size, area, income inequality, regime 
durability, state failure, and dummies for the Cold War, civil wars, and international wars.59 
We also include lagged dependent variables to model inertia in the use of terrorism and 
address additional temporal dynamics. Using the statistical results of a simple probit model, 
we estimate the predicted probability of domestic terrorism for each country every year. 
Similarly, we replicate Gelpi and Avdan’s model to get an estimate of the prospective 
risk of international terrorism for each country. They use a set of directed dyads, where the 
dependent variable is coded “1” if a terrorist incident was recorded against a target state in 
each year from a group operating in the origin state and zero otherwise. Gelpi and Avdan 
(2018) show that a simple model that includes only the distance between states and the prior 
history of terrorism “yields forecasts that are nearly as accurate as the predictions of a model 
with more than 20 covariates” (Ibid.:19). We thus employ this parsimonious model to 
estimate transnational terrorist attacks within each dyad every year, and then create an 
average predicted risk of transnational terrorism for each target state.   
 
Control variables   
Much research shows that domestic and external security threat environments increase the 
risk of coups. We therefore incorporate a dummy variable for international wars to account 
for the independent effect of other concurrent major threats. Moreover, we follow Aksoy et 
al., (2015) and create two mutually exclusive variables that indicate whether a country is 
                                               
58 Although this measure may fail to capture the actual threat in presence of latent or unobservable factors 
affecting terrorism, this prospectively generated measure is currently the best proxy at hand to capture terrorist 
threat for a sufficiently large number of countries and years.  
59 For a detailed discussion, see Wilson and Piazza (2013: 947-48). 
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involved in a civil war crossing the 25 battle deaths threshold per year (low-intensity civil 
war) or the one thousand- battle-deaths threshold (high-intensity civil conflict). Whereas the 
high-intensity dummy variable picks up severe civil wars, the twenty-five-deaths threshold 
“accounts for the numerous conflicts that involve organized insurgents but do not result in a 
high number of yearly casualties” (Ibid.:443).  
To ensure that our variable is not capturing military coups, we exclude all country-
year observations with successful coups using data from Powell (2012). Yet as the risk of 
successful coups could also affect the measurement of our dependent variables, we add a 
binary variable for attempted (but failed) coups at time t, and a dummy variable indicating 
whether there was a coup attempt (regardless of whether it succeeded or failed) in the 
preceding five-year period. We also include a country’s GDP per capita since the risk of 
coups is lower in richer societies using data from the World Bank. Although this does not 
necessarily suggest an effect on military involvement, it is also plausible that civilian 
authorities in wealthier states achieve a higher level of control over the military. We also 
consider a country’s population size since larger countries tend to be regional or global 
powers, which could be linked to the status and prestige of the armed forces. Furthermore, we 
control for the possibility that democracies develop a higher level of civilian control over the 
military using the Polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2017) 
Regime age and leadership’s tenure are also likely to affect MIP, as the longer the 
length of a regime or the tenure of a leader, the lower the risk of military participation in 
politics. We thus control for regime durability, the natural log of the number of years since 
the most recent regime change or the end of a transition period (see Marshall et al., 2017 for 
more detail).  Similarly, we include the log number of years that a chief executive has been in 
office from Cruz and Scartascini (2016). Our model also incorporates the type of 
authoritarian regimes from Geddes et al., (2014), i.e. military, monarchic, personal, and 
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single party. MIP might be driven by rent-seeking such as land use and legal and illegal 
business opportunities, and case studies suggest a strong positive relationship between 
corruption levels and the role of the military in politics (Majeed and MacDonald, 2010). We 
thus include the level of corruption of a country, from the ICRG dataset. Finally, we address 
the issues of spatial dependence by controlling for the average level of military in politics in 
contiguous states to directly account for spatial contagion.60  
 
Results 
We run two-way fixed-effect models (i.e., with country- and year-fixed effects) that use a 
within-transformation, allowing us to control for the likely omission of country-specific 
determinants of MIP and terrorism, and for unobserved common trends. By exploiting 
within-country variation, it also allows us to assess the impact of changes in terrorism on 
changes in MIP over time within the same country. We transform all positive non-
dichotomous variables into logs to simplify the interpretation of the coefficients, scale down 
the variance and reduce the effect of outliers.61 Table B1 in the Appendix reports the 
summary statistics. 
 Table 1 reports the impact of different forms of terrorist violence on the ICRG 
military in politics measure. Before turning to our variables of interest, we summarize the 
results for the controls, based on estimates shown in Table 1. Model (i) is a “naive” 
estimation that merely comprises the controls, next to the country and year fixed effects. 
Hence, Model (i) neglects that actual terrorism and the risk of terrorist violence can also 
affect MIP. Models (ii)-(viii) include our variables of interest, omitting controls to 
demonstrate that our findings are not affected by their inclusion (Clarke, 2009). MIP 
                                               
60 Contiguity is measured using the COW direct contiguity dataset, where the classification system for 
contiguity is comprised of five categories, one for land contiguity and four for water contiguity. 
61 We transform the count variable of terrorist attacks into logs due to the skewed distribution of the number of 
attacks, driven by the large number of zeros. We take all the natural logarithm after adding the value of 1 (to 
avoid calculating the log of 0).  
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decreases with a country’s level of democracy, as the coefficient for the Polity score is 
negative and statistically significant. The length of a political regime is negatively associated 
with MIP, which is consistent with studies showing that regime duration decreases the risk of 
coups. Corruption and military regimes are associated with higher levels of MIP, whereas the 
coefficient of single-party regimes is negative. Coup attempts and both low and high intensity 
civil wars increase MIP. Interstate armed conflicts bears a positive but statistically 
insignificant coefficient, possibly related to the reduction of international wars in the last 
decades. Finally, per capita GDP, population, leadership’s tenure, coups in the previous five 
years and the level of MIP in the neighborhood do not reach statistical significance at 
conventional levels. Note that our estimates are quite conservative, and our empirical strategy 
likely absorbs much of the effects of the controls in either the country or the year fixed-
effects. 
Observed terror attacks are positively signed and highly significant in Models (ii)-(v), 
lending strong support for Hypothesis 1. The coefficients allow for a direct interpretation and 
can be interpreted as elasticities. Therefore, a 10% increase in the total number of terrorist 
attacks (Terrorism) corresponds to an increase in the degree of military involvement of 0.3%, 
with similar results when we use a dummy variable rather than the count of terrorist incidents. 
Similarly, domestic and transnational terrorism have coefficients of comparable magnitude. 
Models (vi)-(viii) reveal the effect of terrorist threats, as measured by the probability of 
terrorism and probability of domestic and transnational terrorist incidents. The probability of 
aggregate terrorism is significant and when we move this indicator by 10% we see an increase 
of 0.5% in the outcome variable, holding all other variables constant. Neither the probability 
of domestic terrorism nor the odds of transnational terrorism are statistically significant.    
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Table 1: Terrorism and Military Involvement in Politics (ICRG) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Population (ln) 0.141        
 (0.160)        
GDP per capita (ln) -0.057        
 (0.055)        
Polity score -0.012***        
 (0.004)        
Regime durability 
(ln) 
-0.035***        
 (0.013)        
Leader tenure (ln) -0.014        
 (0.012)        
Corruption (ln) 0.227***        
 (0.060)        
Personal regime 0.037        
 (0.062)        
Military regime 0.136**        
 (0.056)        
Single-party regime -0.275***        
 (0.087)        
MilPol in 
neighborhood 
0.113        
 (0.101)        
Coup attempt 0.068**        
 (0.031)        
Coup attempt (last 5 
ys) 
0.026        
 (0.028)        
Low-intensity civil 
war 
0.051**        
 (0.025)        
High-intensity civil 
war 
0.077**        
 (0.039)        
Interstate conflict 0.041        
 (0.035)        
Terrorism dummy (t-
1) 
 0.053**
* 
      
  (0.018)       
Terrorism (ln,t-1)   0.030***      
   (0.008)      
Domestic terrorism  
(ln, t-1) 
   0.028***     
    (0.007)     
Transnational 
terrorism (ln, t-1) 
    0.025*    
     (0.014)    
Pr Terrorism  (ln, t-
1) 
     0.049***   
      (0.018)   
Pr Domestic 
Terrorism (ln, t-1) 
      0.050  
       (0.044)  
Pr Transnational 
Terrorism (ln, t-1) 
       0.153 
        (0.298) 
Observations 2377 2758 2758 2773 2945 2593 2593 2852 
$* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. Two-way 
fixed-effects OLS. 
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In Table 2, we present models that incorporate our variables of interest, the control 
variables (shown in the Appendix, Table B2) and fixed-effects. Comparing uncontrolled 
results and results with controls offers interesting insights. As seen, our main results do not 
substantively change by the inclusion of controls, and the statistical significance of the 
coefficients are mostly unaltered. Actual terrorism does affect the way military exerts 
institutional influence. Yet whereas domestic terrorism is still positively signed and 
significant, transnational terrorism does not affect MIP.  Moreover, we find again that our 
proxies for the threat of domestic and transnational terrorism are not significant at convention 
levels.  
 
Table 2: Terrorism and Military Involvement in Politics (ICRG) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
Terrorism 
dummy (t-1) 
0.042***       
 (0.015)       
Terrorism 
(ln,t-1) 
 0.023***      
  (0.007)      
Domestic 
terrorism  (ln, 
t-1) 
  0.022***     
   (0.006)     
Transnational 
terrorism (ln, 
t-1) 
   0.016    
    (0.013)    
Pr Terrorism  
(ln, t-1) 
    0.036***   
     (0.014)   
Pr Domestic 
Terrorism (ln, 
t-1) 
     0.020  
      (0.043)  
Pr 
Transnational 
Terrorism (ln, 
t-1) 
      0.343 
       (0.297) 
Observations 2247 2247 2247 2361 2235 2235 2312 
$* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. Two-way 
fixed-effects OLS. Control variables include:  Population (ln), GDP per capita (ln), Polity score, Regime 
durability (ln), Leader tenure (ln), Corruption (ln),  Personal regime, Military regime, Single-party regime,   
MilPol in neighborhood, Coup attempt, Coup attempt (last 5 ys), Low-intensity civil war, High-intensity civil 
war, Interstate conflict. 
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We assess the robustness of our findings with a variety of additional model 
specifications. We report these results in the Online Appendix, sections B3-B8. A potential 
objection about the use of the ICRG measure is that the data generation process entails 
experts’ subjective judgmental decisions that may produce biased information. Therefore, we 
additionally employ two objective and observable measures of MIP. The first measure is 
taken from White (2017), who has recently introduced the Military Participation in 
Government (MPG) Dataset. It captures the proportion of a state’s cabinet, state council, or 
equivalent that is made up of military officers. The second one is a dummy indicator, which 
takes value “1” if a state’s defense minister is a military officer for the duration of his term –
with no indication of formal retirement when they assumed office– and “0” otherwise (from 
Cruz and Scartascini 2016). The estimates using alternative measures for military 
involvement in politics are consistent with results reported above and are discussed in the 
Appendix.  
Second, the ICRG measure could be also treated as a categorical and ordered variable. 
Using an ordered probit model yields estimates that are virtually identical to those reported in 
Table 1. Third, we estimate probit models with random-effects, as well as rare event logit 
models to assess the robustness of our findings. Fourth, whether terrorism successfully 
increases the level of MIP may depend on a country’s political environment, in particular its 
regime type. Indeed, someone may argue that democracies are less sensitive to the pressure 
of military actors in presence of terrorist violence; however, we find no evidence that regime 
type conditions the effect of terrorism on MIP. The models in the Online Appendix increase 
the confidence in the main results and show that our findings do not depend on specific 
decisions regarding to research design and operationalization of the dependent variable.  
To sum up, we find that observed political violence by terrorist groups is associated 
with an increase in military participation in politics. At the same time, however, the threat of 
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terror attacks also matters, and we find a positive and significant relation between the 
probability of terrorism and MIP. Interestingly, neither the probability of domestic terrorism 
nor the odds of transnational terrorism seem to be associated with MIP, whereas it is only the 
probability of aggregate terrorism that is statistically significant.   
 
Conclusion 
Much research has explored the determinants of coups but little macro-quantitative research 
examines how the military intervenes in politics, without deposing political leaders. This is 
puzzling given a large tradition of case-based research suggesting that state armed actors 
often acquire significant levels of institutional autonomy and can influence policy-making 
processes in relevant areas. Furthermore, the salience of terrorism in the contemporary world 
has generated a great deal of scholarly attention on its causes, but its political repercussions 
remain poorly understood, particularly compared to research on the political consequences of 
civil and international wars. This study contributes to these literatures by examining the 
relationship between terrorist violence and MIP. We argued that terror attacks and terrorist 
threats modify the opportunity structure that facilitates an increasing involvement of the 
armed forces in politics. Our empirical analysis provided strong support to these claims, 
showing that terrorism and perceived threats from terrorist organizations increase MIP. 
Future research could also explore the effects of terrorism on other agencies within the 
security sectors, and also strive to better integrate the different research avenues within the 
civil-military relations field (Brooks, 2019:15), also to enhance a better conceptualization of 
MIP. 
Understanding how terrorism affects civil-military relations is important as terrorism 
can have negative externalities on the quality of democracy and democracy promotion. We 
have shown that terrorist violence facilitates state armed actors’ participation in politics, who 
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can increase their relative role in policy-making processes. Related research has found that 
military actors tend to support harsh repressive measures to fight terrorism and strengthen 
homeland security (Conrad et al., 2014). It is perhaps not surprising that terrorist violence is 
linked to different forms of state-sponsored repression, regardless of regime type (Wagstaff 
2013). Furthermore, civil liberties restrictions and some repressive strategies aimed at 
reducing terrorist threats generally find support among citizens (Davis and Silver, 2004). 
Taken together, these studies suggest that terrorism and MIP interact in a way that can hinder 
states’ respect for human rights and that we should work more to better disentangle these 
dynamics. In the context of the so-called “war on terror”, counter-terrorist strategies 
promoted by foreign powers –most notably the U.S.– often draw on prescriptions endorsed 
by military actors who often privilege security and stability over respect for civil liberties and 
political rights (Wagstaff, 2013; Shah, 2011). Thus, increasing military involvement in 
foreign policy as a result of the “war on terror” can have detrimental effects on democratic 
institutions.   
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Online Appendix 2
A Conceptualizing Military Involvement in Politics
Military Involvement in Politics (MIP) refers to actions and processes where the mil-
itary itself or decision-makers allow the military to exercise any kind of political power
or/and influence policy decisions. In line with some well-established as well more recent
civil-military relations literature, we understand the military as a political actor (Brooks,
2019; Hundman and Parkinson, 2019; Huntington, 1957; Ru↵a et al., 2013; White, 2017).
As Brooks writes, “the military has long been treated as an exceptional actor, in part
because it controls the most lethal forms of armed force in the state and has the power to
directly oust political leaders from o ce. While the military’s coercive power is impor-
tant, however, its political power is not reducible to it” (Brooks, 2019, p.391). MIP does
not only concern the domain of high politics but also of bureaucratic politics, such as an
increase in autonomy in defense spending.
MIP ranges from low levels of involvement in politics, when the militaries are involved
in routine processes of military reforms or defense budget issues, to high levels involve-
ment, for instance when the military enters the domain of ‘high’ politics and is involved
in foreign policy debates and the drafting of constitutions. Any country has its own
‘normal’ level of MIP as a baseline, which may increase following specific shocks, such
as terrorist threats and attacks, as in this paper. From this perspective, any country -
not only autocracies but also democracies - has some levels of MIP. Even in democratic
countries, as we have seen in the case of France, with a strong norm of civilian control,
MIP increases following an increase in terrorist attacks and the threat of terrorism vio-
lence. In autocratic countries, with a higher level of MIP as a baseline, we may observe
similar phenomena. As Brooks points out, neglecting the political nature of the military
and of its involvement in politics “also creates an artificial division between the study of
the military in authoritarian contexts and in democracies by obscuring similarities in the
way the military can influence politics in both” (Brooks, 2019, p. 391). MIP as a concept
allows us to study both democratic and authoritarian regimes together and to recognize
the political nature of the military, even when subordinated to civilian authorities.
Our conceptualization of MIP is similar to Finer’s modes of military intervention but
recognizes the political ‘actorness’ of the military more explicitly (Finer, 2017; Nordlinger,
1977; Stepan, 2015). Our concept of MIP is similar to White’s recent “military partici-
pation in politics” which is “also plausible in all states” (White, 2017, p.580), but it is
broader as we capture all kinds of exercise of political power, even an increase in au-
tonomy. MIP is conceptually and empirically distinct from a coup d’e´tat. While MIP
includes the whole range of actions and processes by which the military exercises political
power, a coup d’e´tat is limited to the actions and processes to take over the government.
While coups d’e´tat are overall rare events, all countries have some levels of involvement
in politics. Empirically, successful coups are very rare events and less than 2% of our
country-year experienced a successful coup. Not surprisingly, the correlation between
e.g., the ICRG level of military involvement in politics and the occurrence of successful
coups is only 12%, and slightly higher, 19%, with attempted coups (a proxy for coup risk).
Online Appendix 3
B1 Summary Statistics
Table B1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Military in Politics (ln) 1.39 0.44 0.69 2.1 2271
Is Defense Minister a Military O cer? 0.32 0.47 0 1 2114
MPG (ln) 0.04 0.08 0 0.69 2197
Terrorism dummy (t-1) 0.6 0.49 0 1 2271
Terrorism (ln,t-1) 1.45 1.6 0 6.31 2271
Domestic terrorism (ln, t-1) 1.06 1.48 0 6.26 2271
Transnational terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.19 0.43 0 2.3 2271
Pr Terrorism (ln, t-1) 3.89 0.69 2.02 4.62 2258
Pr Domestic Terrorism (ln, t-1) 3.65 0.62 1.55 4.62 2258
Pr Transnational Terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.77 2250
Population (ln) 16.27 1.51 12.81 20.98 2271
GDP per capita (ln) 8.34 1.57 4.76 11.51 2271
Polity score 3.02 6.92 -10 10 2271
Regime durability (ln) 2.63 1.29 0 5.28 2271
Leader tenure (ln) 1.76 0.81 0.69 3.85 2271
Corruption (ln) 1.55 0.32 0.77 2.1 2271
Personal regime 0.13 0.33 0 1 2271
Military regime 0.02 0.15 0 1 2271
Single-party regime 0.15 0.36 0 1 2271
MilPol in neighborhood 1.47 0.33 0 2.04 2271
MPG in neighbor (ln) 0.05 0.05 0 0.51 2271
Leader tenure (ln) 1.76 0.81 0.69 3.85 2271
Coup attempt 0.03 0.17 0 1 2271
Coup attempt (last 5 years) 0.11 0.31 0 1 2271
Low-intensity civil war 0.12 0.33 0 1 2271
High-intensity civil war 0.06 0.23 0 1 2271
Interstate conflict 0.03 0.17 0 1 2271
t 1.96 5.44 0 29 2250
t2 33.39 120.62 0 841 2250
t3 690.75 2968.66 0 24389 2250
B2 Table 2: full results
Online Appendix 4
Table B2: Military Involvement in Politics (ICRG) and Terrorism: full results
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Population (ln) 0.172 0.163 0.157 0.136 0.176 0.176 0.098
(0.163) (0.164) (0.164) (0.165) (0.165) (0.167) (0.163)
GDP per capita (ln) -0.048 -0.055 -0.053 -0.059 -0.047 -0.050 -0.054
(0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.055) (0.061) (0.063) (0.060)
Polity score -0.012⇤⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤⇤ -0.011⇤⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Regime durability (ln) -0.032⇤⇤ -0.032⇤⇤ -0.033⇤⇤ -0.034⇤⇤ -0.030⇤⇤ -0.032⇤⇤ -0.032⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Leader tenure (ln) -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Corruption (ln) 0.189⇤⇤⇤ 0.184⇤⇤⇤ 0.186⇤⇤⇤ 0.228⇤⇤⇤ 0.189⇤⇤⇤ 0.192⇤⇤⇤ 0.223⇤⇤⇤
(0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.060) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058)
Personal regime 0.035 0.042 0.042 0.039 0.043 0.043 0.017
(0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.062) (0.067) (0.068) (0.064)
Military regime 0.139⇤⇤⇤ 0.124⇤⇤⇤ 0.123⇤⇤ 0.137⇤⇤ 0.140⇤⇤⇤ 0.140⇤⇤ 0.138⇤⇤
(0.051) (0.047) (0.051) (0.056) (0.052) (0.056) (0.056)
Single-party regime -0.270⇤⇤⇤ -0.271⇤⇤⇤ -0.273⇤⇤⇤ -0.272⇤⇤⇤ -0.261⇤⇤⇤ -0.269⇤⇤⇤ -0.254⇤⇤⇤
(0.083) (0.081) (0.087) (0.087) (0.084) (0.088) (0.089)
MilPol in neighborhood 0.098 0.087 0.094 0.112 0.095 0.101 0.135
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.101)
Coup attempt 0.067⇤⇤ 0.065⇤⇤ 0.067⇤⇤ 0.070⇤⇤ 0.070⇤⇤ 0.070⇤⇤ 0.056⇤
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031)
Coup attempt (last 5 ys) 0.031 0.034 0.031 0.027 0.033 0.030 0.019
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Low-intensity civil war 0.048⇤ 0.035 0.038 0.049⇤ 0.048⇤ 0.052⇤⇤ 0.050⇤⇤
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025)
High-intensity civil war 0.072⇤ 0.046 0.049 0.076⇤ 0.070⇤ 0.076⇤⇤ 0.077⇤
(0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041)
Interstate conflict 0.046 0.041 0.044 0.041 0.044 0.046 0.041
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.035)
Terrorism dummy (t-1) 0.042⇤⇤⇤
(0.015)
Terrorism (ln,t-1) 0.023⇤⇤⇤
(0.007)
Domestic terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.022⇤⇤⇤
(0.006)
Transnational terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.016
(0.013)
Pr Terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.036⇤⇤⇤
(0.014)
Pr Domestic Terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.020
(0.043)
Pr Transnational Terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.343
(0.297)
Constant -1.279 -1.048 -0.969 -0.655 -1.455 -1.367 -0.161
(2.672) (2.676) (2.683) (2.722) (2.743) (2.762) (2.683)
Observations 2247 2247 2247 2361 2235 2235 2312
⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. Two-way fixed-e↵ects OLS.
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B3 Military Participation in Government (MPG)
We employ two additional objective and observable measures of military involvement
in politics. The first one is taken from White (2017), who has recently introduced the
Military Participation in Government (MPG) Dataset. It captures the proportion of a
state’s cabinet, state council, or equivalent that is made up of military o cers. This is a
human-coded dataset that includes all politically important positions in the government’s
executive branch (e.g., cabinets, state councils, revolutionary command councils, presid-
iums, and privy councils). As such, the proportion of a government’s positions held by
state armed actors helps us to capture more broadly the terrorism-MIP nexus. We ex-
clude all instances of successful coups to ensure that they do not a↵ect the measurement
of our dependent variables.
Table A3 shows our main results using White’s (2017) measure of military participation
in politics (MPG). Overall, the results are consistent with those reported in the main
article. Like in Table 1, (ICRG measure), The table presents OLS estimates with log-
transformations of both MPG and the terrorism variables. Therefore, a 10% increase in
the total number of terrorist attacks (Terrorism) is now associated with an increase in
MPG of about 0.06%. However, when we turn to the ex-ante probabilities of terrorism,
we find that a 10% increase in the probability of domestic terrorism is related to a 0.17%
increase in the dependent variable, in the same order of magnitude as in Table 1. Similarly,
increasing by 10% the risk of aggregate terrorism is correlated with a 0.05% increase in the
number of government’s positions held by the military. Surprisingly, there is a negative
and significant correlation between the probability of transnational terrorism and MIP
whereas the number of transnational terrorism events and the terrorism dummy are not
significant at conventional levels.1
1We refer the interested reader to White (2017) for detailed information on the variables associated
to his own measure of Military Political Participation (MPG), including the robustness checks.
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Table B3: Active military government share (MPG) and Terrorism
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Population (ln) -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.006
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
GDP per capita (ln) 0.050⇤⇤⇤ 0.050⇤⇤⇤ 0.050⇤⇤⇤ 0.037⇤⇤⇤ 0.052⇤⇤⇤ 0.054⇤⇤⇤ 0.048⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Polity score -0.005⇤⇤⇤ -0.005⇤⇤⇤ -0.005⇤⇤⇤ -0.005⇤⇤⇤ -0.005⇤⇤⇤ -0.005⇤⇤⇤ -0.005⇤⇤⇤
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regime durability (ln) 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Leader tenure (ln) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Corruption (ln) 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.013 0.012
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Personal regime -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 -0.007 -0.016⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Military regime 0.123⇤⇤⇤ 0.119⇤⇤⇤ 0.119⇤⇤⇤ 0.122⇤⇤⇤ 0.122⇤⇤⇤ 0.122⇤⇤⇤ 0.122⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Single-party regime -0.036⇤⇤⇤ -0.036⇤⇤⇤ -0.037⇤⇤⇤ -0.033⇤⇤⇤ -0.036⇤⇤⇤ -0.034⇤⇤⇤ -0.035⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
MPG in neighbor (ln) -0.125⇤⇤⇤ -0.145⇤⇤⇤ -0.139⇤⇤⇤ -0.114⇤⇤⇤ -0.126⇤⇤⇤ -0.121⇤⇤⇤ -0.116⇤⇤⇤
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034)
Coup attempt 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Coup attempt (last 5 years) -0.014⇤⇤⇤ -0.013⇤⇤ -0.013⇤⇤⇤ -0.011⇤⇤ -0.013⇤⇤⇤ -0.014⇤⇤⇤ -0.015⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
High-intensity civil war 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.010 0.004 -0.001 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Low-intensity civil war 0.017⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Interstate conflict 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.012⇤ 0.010 0.009 0.013⇤
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Terrorism dummy (t-1) 0.003
(0.003)
Terrorism (ln,t-1) 0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.001)
Domestic terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.001)
Transnational terrorism (ln, t-1) -0.002
(0.003)
Pr Terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.005⇤
(0.003)
Pr Domestic Terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.017⇤⇤⇤
(0.006)
Pr Transnational Terrorism (ln, t-1) -0.077⇤
(0.040)
Observations 2197 2197 2197 2310 2185 2185 2261
⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-way fixed-e↵ects OLS.
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B4 Defense minister is a military o cer
The second dependent variable is a dummy indicator, which takes value “1” if a state’s
defense minister is a military o cer for the duration of his term ?with no indication of
formal retirement when they assumed o ce? and “0” otherwise (from Cruz et al., 2016).
This measure helps capture the degree of civilian control over the military and it is con-
sistent with case-based research in the field (Pion-Berlin, 1992). As Pion-Berlin (1992,
p.89) puts it: “Executives [..] prefer their authority to be centralized in a single, civilian-
directed defense ministry, as opposed to separate, military-supervised army, air force, and
navy ministries. Where civilians control a single defense ministry, military autonomy is
at its lowest. Where a military-supervised defense ministry or separate branch ministries
under civilian control exist, then military autonomy is higher, and it is higher still where
cabinet-ranking military ministers run their own bureaucracies.” Relatedly, Bruneau and
Goetze (2006, p.78) claim that the Ministry of Defense is perhaps the “most indispensable
institutional mechanism” for establishing civilian control of the military. This is because
the Ministry of Defense is “the organizational link between the democratic government
and the military that allows politicians to translate policy preferences into military com-
mands. It is important that the ministry assumes key defense-related powers in defense
and not relegates these to the military commanders. These include major responsibility
for organizing defense forces and preparing defense objectives, plans, strategies, and even
doctrines” (Pion-Berlin, 2009, p.567). Similarly, Kohn (1997, p.10) argues that “in na-
tions new to democracy, where the military carries the burden of loyalty to previously
autocratic governments, the public should insist that a civilian serve as defense minister.”
Put di↵erently, having members of the government with a military background tends to
be related to a higher military involvement in politics. As such, our variable indicating
whether the defense minister is a military o cer is a good measure of MIP.
As in previous models, we use a fixed-e↵ects logit model that allows us to avoid
biased estimates for our variables of interest that are likely to be related to time invariant
unobserved factors. We also include a cubic polynomial of the number of years elapsed
since the last time a defense minister was a military o cer in the case of each country
(t, t2, t3). The inclusion of the t, t2, and t3 ensures that we explicitly model any
temporal dependence Carter and Signorino (2010). Table A4 shows the results. Despite
the substantively di↵erent dependent variable, the new coe cients have the same signs
as before and are significant except in column iv, where the number of transnational
terrorism is indistinguishable from zero. Interestingly, both the probability of domestic
terrorism as well as transnational terrorism are now positive and statistically significant, as
predicted by Hypothesis 2. These results suggest that the causes of military involvement
in politics may di↵er, and hence our conceptual and empirical distinction is relevant for
understanding military involvement in politics in general.
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Table B4: Defense minister is a military o cer and Terrorism
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Is Defense Minister a Military O cer?
Population (ln) 17.353⇤⇤⇤ 16.843⇤⇤⇤ 16.746⇤⇤⇤ 16.556⇤⇤⇤ 17.423⇤⇤⇤ 17.250⇤⇤⇤ 15.745⇤⇤⇤
(2.772) (2.765) (2.760) (2.692) (2.800) (2.807) (2.758)
GDP per capita (ln) 4.240⇤⇤⇤ 4.083⇤⇤⇤ 4.124⇤⇤⇤ 4.245⇤⇤⇤ 4.296⇤⇤⇤ 4.566⇤⇤⇤ 4.076⇤⇤⇤
(0.895) (0.902) (0.900) (0.872) (0.899) (0.913) (0.892)
Polity score -0.264⇤⇤⇤ -0.268⇤⇤⇤ -0.272⇤⇤⇤ -0.263⇤⇤⇤ -0.268⇤⇤⇤ -0.308⇤⇤⇤ -0.269⇤⇤⇤
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.046)
Regime durability (ln) -0.286⇤ -0.287⇤ -0.315⇤⇤ -0.309⇤⇤ -0.251⇤ -0.289⇤ -0.291⇤
(0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.148) (0.152) (0.151) (0.149)
Leader tenure (ln) 0.068 0.079 0.054 0.087 0.081 0.117 0.122
(0.178) (0.178) (0.177) (0.171) (0.177) (0.179) (0.178)
Corruption (ln) 1.983⇤⇤ 1.855⇤⇤ 1.879⇤⇤ 2.248⇤⇤⇤ 1.961⇤⇤ 1.806⇤⇤ 2.519⇤⇤⇤
(0.823) (0.833) (0.834) (0.810) (0.835) (0.845) (0.842)
Personal regime -2.556⇤⇤⇤ -2.538⇤⇤⇤ -2.491⇤⇤⇤ -1.695⇤⇤ -2.484⇤⇤⇤ -2.336⇤⇤⇤ -2.092⇤⇤⇤
(0.763) (0.761) (0.766) (0.724) (0.757) (0.750) (0.725)
Military regime -0.036 -0.413 -0.282 0.029 -0.110 0.068 -0.269
(0.900) (0.879) (0.885) (0.897) (0.904) (0.899) (0.913)
Single-party regime -2.233⇤⇤⇤ -2.322⇤⇤⇤ -2.232⇤⇤⇤ -2.446⇤⇤⇤ -2.123⇤⇤ -2.154⇤⇤ -2.018⇤⇤
(0.832) (0.839) (0.831) (0.824) (0.834) (0.842) (0.850)
Defence Min. in neighbor 2.785⇤⇤⇤ 2.668⇤⇤⇤ 2.671⇤⇤⇤ 2.421⇤⇤⇤ 2.630⇤⇤⇤ 2.632⇤⇤⇤ 2.734⇤⇤⇤
(0.713) (0.711) (0.713) (0.685) (0.707) (0.694) (0.701)
Coup attempt 0.397 0.336 0.398 0.242 0.343 0.128 -0.085
(0.752) (0.758) (0.750) (0.675) (0.763) (0.753) (0.697)
Coup attempt (last 5 ys) 0.480 0.530 0.514 0.194 0.487 0.554 0.161
(0.385) (0.383) (0.383) (0.355) (0.383) (0.381) (0.367)
Low-intensity civil war 0.219 0.084 0.138 0.591 0.218 -0.069 0.598
(0.395) (0.403) (0.400) (0.376) (0.396) (0.413) (0.384)
High-intensity civil war -0.037 -0.272 -0.200 0.029 -0.118 -0.706 0.216
(0.535) (0.552) (0.552) (0.489) (0.552) (0.608) (0.535)
Interstate conflict 1.244⇤⇤ 1.162⇤ 1.233⇤⇤ 1.163⇤⇤ 1.262⇤⇤ 1.139⇤ 1.209⇤⇤
(0.605) (0.606) (0.612) (0.582) (0.611) (0.622) (0.586)
t -0.343 -0.334 -0.359 -0.283 -0.441 -0.398 -0.301
(0.315) (0.314) (0.311) (0.296) (0.311) (0.307) (0.299)
t2 0.069 0.067 0.068 0.058 0.081⇤ 0.073 0.060
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
t3 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Terrorism dummy (t-1) 0.546⇤
(0.301)
Terrorism (ln,t-1) 0.304⇤⇤⇤
(0.115)
Domestic terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.263⇤⇤
(0.116)
Transnational terrorism (ln, t-1) -0.069
(0.305)
Pr Terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.669⇤⇤⇤
(0.260)
Pr Domestic Terrorism (ln, t-1) 1.642⇤⇤⇤
(0.517)
Pr Transnational Terrorism (ln, t-1) 13.023⇤⇤
(5.306)
Observations 969 969 969 1022 950 950 981
⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Fixed-E↵ects Logit Models with cubic time polynomial.
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B5 Ordered probit
The ICRG military in politics measure could be also treated as a categorical and
ordered variable. As a robustness check, we therefore round it to the nearest integer and
estimate ordered probit models with random e↵ects instead of the linear model employed
in Table 2. As we can see from Table A5, using a probit model yields empirical estimates
that are almost identical to those reported in Table 2.
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Table B5: Military Involvement in Politics (ICRG) and Terrorism: Ordered Probit
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Population (ln) 0.113 0.083 0.080 0.119 0.085 0.086 0.085
(0.119) (0.120) (0.119) (0.110) (0.120) (0.141) (0.112)
GDP per capita (ln) -0.709⇤⇤⇤ -0.743⇤⇤⇤ -0.723⇤⇤⇤ -0.689⇤⇤⇤ -0.712⇤⇤⇤ -0.694⇤⇤⇤ -0.675⇤⇤⇤
(0.157) (0.158) (0.160) (0.149) (0.159) (0.162) (0.154)
Polity score -0.099⇤⇤⇤ -0.101⇤⇤⇤ -0.103⇤⇤⇤ -0.098⇤⇤⇤ -0.101⇤⇤⇤ -0.100⇤⇤⇤ -0.101⇤⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
Regime durability (ln) -0.250⇤⇤⇤ -0.254⇤⇤⇤ -0.266⇤⇤⇤ -0.274⇤⇤⇤ -0.235⇤⇤⇤ -0.251⇤⇤⇤ -0.252⇤⇤⇤
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.086) (0.089) (0.092) (0.086)
Leader tenure (ln) -0.116 -0.115 -0.119 -0.148 -0.112 -0.111 -0.115
(0.093) (0.094) (0.095) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093) (0.091)
Corruption (ln) 1.804⇤⇤⇤ 1.741⇤⇤⇤ 1.753⇤⇤⇤ 2.038⇤⇤⇤ 1.821⇤⇤⇤ 1.848⇤⇤⇤ 2.086⇤⇤⇤
(0.398) (0.400) (0.403) (0.408) (0.401) (0.409) (0.409)
Personal regime 0.265 0.302 0.302 0.256 0.338 0.331 0.116
(0.441) (0.442) (0.444) (0.414) (0.447) (0.449) (0.424)
Military regime 0.971⇤⇤ 0.871⇤⇤ 0.850⇤⇤ 0.958⇤ 0.980⇤⇤ 0.969⇤⇤ 0.964⇤
(0.438) (0.392) (0.414) (0.490) (0.443) (0.480) (0.498)
Single-party regime -1.619⇤⇤⇤ -1.631⇤⇤⇤ -1.646⇤⇤⇤ -1.620⇤⇤⇤ -1.555⇤⇤⇤ -1.601⇤⇤⇤ -1.541⇤⇤⇤
(0.433) (0.424) (0.458) (0.445) (0.439) (0.460) (0.462)
MilPol in neighborhood 1.208⇤ 1.113⇤ 1.165⇤ 1.327⇤⇤ 1.219⇤ 1.269⇤⇤ 1.511⇤⇤
(0.630) (0.635) (0.637) (0.616) (0.634) (0.640) (0.627)
Coup attempt 0.521⇤⇤ 0.511⇤⇤ 0.533⇤⇤ 0.547⇤⇤⇤ 0.538⇤⇤ 0.538⇤⇤ 0.447⇤⇤
(0.210) (0.213) (0.211) (0.205) (0.218) (0.211) (0.197)
Coup attempt (last 5 years) 0.112 0.136 0.122 0.113 0.128 0.103 0.058
(0.185) (0.185) (0.184) (0.180) (0.185) (0.192) (0.192)
Low-intensity civil war 0.416⇤⇤ 0.299⇤ 0.326⇤ 0.461⇤⇤⇤ 0.413⇤⇤ 0.436⇤⇤⇤ 0.455⇤⇤⇤
(0.181) (0.174) (0.172) (0.172) (0.176) (0.164) (0.176)
High-intensity civil war 0.608⇤⇤ 0.392 0.412 0.707⇤⇤ 0.584⇤ 0.617⇤⇤ 0.670⇤⇤
(0.306) (0.286) (0.283) (0.298) (0.306) (0.291) (0.302)
Interstate conflict 0.344 0.299 0.326 0.337 0.338 0.351 0.339
(0.317) (0.312) (0.307) (0.290) (0.313) (0.318) (0.288)
Terrorism dummy (t-1) 0.335⇤⇤⇤
(0.110)
Terrorism (ln,t-1) 0.185⇤⇤⇤
(0.047)
Domestic terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.181⇤⇤⇤
(0.045)
Transnational terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.108
(0.086)
Pr Terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.298⇤⇤⇤
(0.100)
Pr Domestic Terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.195
(0.276)
Pr Transnational Terrorism (ln, t-1) 3.430
(2.232)
Observations 2247 2247 2247 2361 2235 2235 2312
⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level.
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B6 Probit models with random-e↵ects
Our alternative dependent variable, whether the defense minister is a military o cer,
is dichotomous and we have used logit models with fixed-e↵ects. Yet, classical fixed-e↵ect
models exclude potentially informative observations where we do not observe variation in
the dependent variable over time (about 51% of the total number of observations). As a
robustness check, we also employ probit models with random-e↵ects. The random-e↵ects
model yields consistent and e cient estimates under the assumption of exogeneity of the
covariates with respect to the country intercept, although many covariates could be corre-
lated with the country intercept. To relax this assumption and allow for the endogeneity
of the covariates regarding the time-invariant country intercept, we estimate random ef-
fect models which include the country (cluster) mean of the covariates (a la Mundlak,
1978). This model has many desirable features, as it obtains consistent estimates that
are not influenced by the specification of the country intercept. It also controls for all
unobservable di↵erences between countries, dealing with all country-specific characteris-
tics that may a↵ect the chances of having a military defense minister and the security
environment at the same time. Yet, as opposed to the fixed-e↵ect estimates, it does not
require us to exclude as non-informative all countries where we do not observe variation
in the dependent variable (see Gupte et al., 2014, for a recent application and full discus-
sion). Table A6 presents this new set of estimates, and we can see that our results are
not driven by the choice of the model, and the previous findings carry over.
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Table B6: Defense Minister and Terrorism: Probit
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Is Defense Minister a Military O cer?
Population (ln) 13.719⇤⇤⇤ 13.310⇤⇤⇤ 13.207⇤⇤⇤ 11.731⇤⇤⇤ 13.868⇤⇤⇤ 13.725⇤⇤⇤ 12.048⇤⇤⇤
(2.561) (2.553) (2.539) (2.439) (2.606) (2.630) (2.535)
GDP per capita (ln) 3.519⇤⇤⇤ 3.336⇤⇤⇤ 3.373⇤⇤⇤ 3.209⇤⇤⇤ 3.636⇤⇤⇤ 3.883⇤⇤⇤ 3.189⇤⇤⇤
(0.843) (0.844) (0.842) (0.807) (0.851) (0.861) (0.840)
Polity score -0.294⇤⇤⇤ -0.297⇤⇤⇤ -0.301⇤⇤⇤ -0.298⇤⇤⇤ -0.295⇤⇤⇤ -0.332⇤⇤⇤ -0.304⇤⇤⇤
(0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045)
Regime durability (ln) -0.350⇤⇤ -0.345⇤⇤ -0.374⇤⇤ -0.396⇤⇤⇤ -0.310⇤⇤ -0.345⇤⇤ -0.364⇤⇤
(0.146) (0.146) (0.145) (0.143) (0.148) (0.147) (0.145)
Leader tenure (ln) 0.094 0.117 0.093 0.140 0.107 0.150 0.164
(0.176) (0.177) (0.176) (0.169) (0.176) (0.178) (0.177)
Corruption (ln) 1.700⇤⇤ 1.560⇤ 1.581⇤ 1.885⇤⇤ 1.646⇤⇤ 1.519⇤ 2.114⇤⇤
(0.813) (0.823) (0.821) (0.788) (0.823) (0.830) (0.823)
Personal regime -2.126⇤⇤⇤ -2.122⇤⇤⇤ -2.076⇤⇤⇤ -1.290⇤ -2.062⇤⇤⇤ -1.902⇤⇤⇤ -1.753⇤⇤
(0.722) (0.719) (0.722) (0.693) (0.720) (0.714) (0.701)
Military regime -0.139 -0.515 -0.404 -0.131 -0.165 -0.026 -0.330
(0.901) (0.877) (0.883) (0.897) (0.898) (0.895) (0.914)
Single-party regime -2.044⇤⇤⇤ -2.128⇤⇤⇤ -2.042⇤⇤⇤ -1.957⇤⇤⇤ -1.977⇤⇤⇤ -1.935⇤⇤ -1.629⇤⇤
(0.749) (0.756) (0.751) (0.733) (0.756) (0.767) (0.760)
Defence Min. in neighbor 2.655⇤⇤⇤ 2.572⇤⇤⇤ 2.572⇤⇤⇤ 2.478⇤⇤⇤ 2.535⇤⇤⇤ 2.563⇤⇤⇤ 2.821⇤⇤⇤
(0.680) (0.678) (0.679) (0.654) (0.676) (0.667) (0.675)
Coup attempt 0.231 0.154 0.217 0.061 0.192 -0.007 -0.233
(0.738) (0.739) (0.734) (0.677) (0.749) (0.744) (0.702)
Coup attempt (last 5 ys) 0.459 0.513 0.495 0.158 0.474 0.539 0.153
(0.382) (0.380) (0.380) (0.355) (0.381) (0.381) (0.369)
Low-intensity civil war 0.165 -0.015 0.041 0.445 0.136 -0.167 0.471
(0.391) (0.400) (0.398) (0.373) (0.394) (0.413) (0.384)
High-intensity civil war -0.160 -0.442 -0.374 -0.166 -0.227 -0.818 0.031
(0.528) (0.545) (0.545) (0.487) (0.545) (0.602) (0.531)
Interstate conflict 1.170⇤ 1.069⇤ 1.134⇤ 1.057⇤ 1.190⇤ 1.041⇤ 1.094⇤
(0.605) (0.603) (0.608) (0.583) (0.613) (0.624) (0.588)
t -0.363 -0.353 -0.369 -0.248 -0.424 -0.390 -0.265
(0.276) (0.276) (0.276) (0.258) (0.279) (0.275) (0.263)
t2 0.060⇤ 0.059 0.060 0.043 0.067⇤ 0.061⇤ 0.047
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034)
t3 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Terrorism dummy (t-1) 0.462
(0.289)
Terrorism (ln,t-1) 0.320⇤⇤⇤
(0.110)
Domestic terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.282⇤⇤
(0.113)
Transnational terrorism (ln, t-1) -0.144
(0.300)
Pr Terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.615⇤⇤
(0.253)
Pr Domestic Terrorism (ln, t-1) 1.612⇤⇤⇤
(0.511)
Pr Transnational Terrorism (ln, t-1) 9.754⇤⇤
(4.002)
Constant -8.363 -6.939 -7.043 -11.721 -8.564 -6.020 -9.989
(14.212) (14.025) (14.138) (13.563) (14.439) (14.644) (14.873)
Observations 2069 2069 2069 2182 2058 2058 2133
⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Country means of all time-variant covariates and year dummies are included but not reported
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B7 Rare event
Third, we assess the robustness of our results to the rarity of ones in the dependent
variable. For addressing any potential concerns in light of this rare-events problem, we
re-estimated our core models with the rare-events logistic regression estimator by King
and Zeng (2001). Table A7 in this appendix summarizes our results when using this
estimator that directly corrects for the potential bias due to a rare-events data-generating
process. As shown in this table, though, our results mirror the findings we discuss in
the main text, although transnational terrorism fails to achieve statistical significance
at conventional levels. The terrorism dummy is not statistical significant, although the
coe cient comes close to significance at the 10% level.
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Table B7: Defense Minister and Terrorism: Rare Event Logit
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Population (ln) 0.243⇤⇤⇤ 0.229⇤⇤⇤ 0.228⇤⇤⇤ 0.261⇤⇤⇤ 0.212⇤⇤⇤ 0.108⇤ 0.264⇤⇤⇤
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.046) (0.061) (0.043)
GDP per capita (ln) -0.219⇤⇤⇤ -0.221⇤⇤⇤ -0.221⇤⇤⇤ -0.186⇤⇤⇤ -0.239⇤⇤⇤ -0.273⇤⇤⇤ -0.192⇤⇤⇤
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.052) (0.054) (0.049)
Polity score -0.093⇤⇤⇤ -0.098⇤⇤⇤ -0.097⇤⇤⇤ -0.093⇤⇤⇤ -0.097⇤⇤⇤ -0.103⇤⇤⇤ -0.097⇤⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
Regime durability (ln) -0.212⇤⇤⇤ -0.213⇤⇤⇤ -0.220⇤⇤⇤ -0.194⇤⇤⇤ -0.196⇤⇤⇤ -0.185⇤⇤⇤ -0.200⇤⇤⇤
(0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.054) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056)
Leader tenure (ln) 0.041 0.041 0.036 -0.016 0.053 0.062 -0.028
(0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.079) (0.086) (0.085) (0.083)
Corruption (ln) 0.620⇤⇤ 0.675⇤⇤⇤ 0.613⇤⇤ 0.607⇤⇤ 0.595⇤⇤ 0.581⇤⇤ 0.527⇤⇤
(0.259) (0.261) (0.258) (0.255) (0.262) (0.261) (0.259)
Personal regime -0.175 -0.136 -0.149 -0.084 -0.200 -0.142 -0.015
(0.184) (0.185) (0.184) (0.176) (0.188) (0.192) (0.178)
Military regime 0.346 0.318 0.319 0.339 0.342 0.335 0.363
(0.340) (0.348) (0.346) (0.337) (0.342) (0.347) (0.337)
Single-party regime -0.843⇤⇤⇤ -0.780⇤⇤⇤ -0.799⇤⇤⇤ -0.648⇤⇤⇤ -0.836⇤⇤⇤ -0.796⇤⇤⇤ -0.495⇤⇤⇤
(0.200) (0.200) (0.199) (0.186) (0.202) (0.202) (0.185)
Defence Min. in neighbor 1.895⇤⇤⇤ 1.826⇤⇤⇤ 1.828⇤⇤⇤ 1.984⇤⇤⇤ 1.924⇤⇤⇤ 1.981⇤⇤⇤ 1.994⇤⇤⇤
(0.258) (0.259) (0.261) (0.253) (0.260) (0.263) (0.262)
Coup attempt -0.637⇤ -0.635⇤ -0.639⇤ -0.577⇤ -0.548 -0.564 -0.627⇤
(0.349) (0.351) (0.351) (0.346) (0.348) (0.350) (0.362)
Coup attempt (last 5 ys) 0.836⇤⇤⇤ 0.842⇤⇤⇤ 0.854⇤⇤⇤ 0.647⇤⇤⇤ 0.860⇤⇤⇤ 0.885⇤⇤⇤ 0.770⇤⇤⇤
(0.188) (0.190) (0.189) (0.188) (0.188) (0.189) (0.194)
Low-intensity civil war 0.081 -0.084 -0.019 0.262⇤ 0.032 -0.110 0.198
(0.157) (0.160) (0.159) (0.153) (0.159) (0.172) (0.153)
High-intensity civil war 0.620⇤⇤⇤ 0.382⇤ 0.426⇤ 0.633⇤⇤⇤ 0.550⇤⇤ 0.282 0.667⇤⇤⇤
(0.221) (0.231) (0.234) (0.213) (0.229) (0.261) (0.213)
Interstate conflict -0.612⇤⇤ -0.744⇤⇤ -0.725⇤⇤ -0.368 -0.639⇤⇤ -0.678⇤⇤ -0.509⇤
(0.300) (0.315) (0.311) (0.286) (0.296) (0.294) (0.290)
t -0.258⇤⇤ -0.250⇤⇤ -0.268⇤⇤ -0.200⇤ -0.249⇤⇤ -0.263⇤⇤ -0.171
(0.120) (0.119) (0.120) (0.114) (0.121) (0.122) (0.113)
t2 0.030⇤⇤ 0.030⇤⇤ 0.030⇤⇤ 0.025⇤⇤ 0.029⇤⇤ 0.031⇤⇤ 0.021⇤
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
t3 -0.001⇤⇤ -0.001⇤⇤ -0.001⇤⇤ -0.001⇤⇤ -0.001⇤⇤ -0.001⇤⇤ -0.001⇤
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Terrorism dummy (t-1) 0.239⇤
(0.127)
Terrorism (ln,t-1) 0.145⇤⇤⇤
(0.040)
Domestic terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.122⇤⇤⇤
(0.043)
Transnational terrorism (ln, t-1) -0.400⇤⇤⇤
(0.140)
Pr Terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.259⇤⇤
(0.105)
Pr Domestic Terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.588⇤⇤⇤
(0.190)
Pr Transnational Terrorism (ln, t-1) -1.030
(1.137)
Constant -4.143⇤⇤⇤ -4.000⇤⇤⇤ -3.782⇤⇤⇤ -4.514⇤⇤⇤ -4.365⇤⇤⇤ -3.536⇤⇤⇤ -4.292⇤⇤⇤
(0.982) (0.990) (0.994) (0.936) (1.011) (1.015) (0.958)
Observations 2093 2093 2093 2206 2080 2080 2156
⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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B8 The role of political regimes: a conditional e↵ect
It may well be the case that terrorism influences the civilian control of the military and
increases the degree of military involvement in policymaking conditional on a country’s
level of democracy. In fact, democratic regimes, given the system of checks and balances,
could be less permeable to the pressure of military actors in presence of terrorist violence.
We thus first replicate baseline models in Table 2 and add an interaction between actual
terrorism and a simple dummy variable taking value “1” if a country has a Polity score
< 7 and “0” otherwise, following traditional studies on democratization and the con-
ventional strategy within the democratic peace theory (e.g., Gleditsch and Ward, 2006).
Results are shown in Table A8, models (i)-(iv). Second, we we also add an interaction
between the terrorism dummy and the full scale of the Polity score (see model (v) in
Table A8). Whereas the democracy dummy or the Polity score are consistently negative
and significant, as one would expect, there is no support for the claim that regime type
conditions the e↵ect we argued for in the first hypothesis. In fact, the level of terrorism,
per se, remains negative but its interaction with regime time is consistently insignificant
at conventional levels. As such, the impact of terrorism on military involvement does not
seem to vary across di↵erent democracy levels.
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Table B8: Military Involvement in Politics (ICRG) and Terrorism: A Conditional E↵ect
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Population (ln) 0.149 0.137 0.134 0.106 0.175
(0.156) (0.157) (0.157) (0.156) (0.163)
GDP per capita (ln) -0.046 -0.055 -0.052 -0.058 -0.046
(0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.052) (0.059)
Regime durability (ln) -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.018⇤ -0.032⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Leader tenure (ln) -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 -0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Corruption (ln) 0.194⇤⇤⇤ 0.190⇤⇤⇤ 0.192⇤⇤⇤ 0.235⇤⇤⇤ 0.189⇤⇤⇤
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057)
Personal regime 0.057 0.065 0.067 0.067 0.036
(0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.057) (0.065)
Military regime 0.163⇤⇤⇤ 0.151⇤⇤⇤ 0.149⇤⇤⇤ 0.161⇤⇤⇤ 0.138⇤⇤⇤
(0.045) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051)
Single-party regime -0.266⇤⇤⇤ -0.266⇤⇤⇤ -0.267⇤⇤⇤ -0.268⇤⇤⇤ -0.270⇤⇤⇤
(0.085) (0.084) (0.089) (0.089) (0.083)
MilPol in neighborhood 0.069 0.062 0.068 0.082 0.095
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.101)
Coup attempt 0.070⇤⇤ 0.068⇤⇤ 0.070⇤⇤ 0.071⇤⇤ 0.068⇤⇤
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032)
Coup attempt (last 5 ys) 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.019 0.031
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
Low-intensity civil war 0.041 0.031 0.033 0.046⇤ 0.047⇤
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
High-intensity civil war 0.065⇤ 0.044 0.046 0.072⇤ 0.071⇤
(0.039) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.041)
Interstate conflict 0.047 0.043 0.045 0.041 0.046
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.038)
Terrorism dummy (t-1)=1 0.047⇤⇤ 0.044⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.016)
democracy=1 -0.131⇤⇤⇤ -0.135⇤⇤⇤ -0.129⇤⇤⇤ -0.136⇤⇤⇤
(0.043) (0.048) (0.048) (0.045)
Terrorism dummy (t-1)=1 X democracy=1 -0.013
(0.025)
Terrorism (ln,t-1) 0.021⇤⇤
(0.009)
democracy=1 X Terrorism (ln,t-1) 0.000
(0.010)
Domestic terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.021⇤⇤
(0.010)
democracy=1 X Domestic terrorism (ln, t-1) -0.004
(0.012)
Transnational terrorism (ln, t-1) 0.020
(0.020)
democracy=1 X Transnational terrorism (ln, t-1) -0.005
(0.026)
Polity score -0.011⇤⇤
(0.004)
Terrorism dummy (t-1)=1 X Polity score -0.001
(0.002)
Observations 2263 2263 2263 2377 2247
⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. Two-way fixed-e↵ects OLS.
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C Illustrative case studies
We conducted two in-depth case studies in order to illustrate and shed light on the
causal mechanisms at play. We selected the cases of France (1995-98 and 2015-16) and
Algeria (1989-92). As a first step, the primary logic for selecting those cases was to identify
instances in which we could observe how the mechanisms unfold and to clarify them.
Therefore, we selected them from the dataset among all those countries that displayed a
co-variation between the variables of interest and the outcome. From a theoretical point
of view, we chose Algeria and France because we are interested in illustrating that our
main argument holds in both democratic (France) and non-democratic (Algeria) states.
In this regard, we followed a similar logic to that of the ‘pathway’ case, introduced by
Gerring:
“Here, the broader cross-case relationship is known, either on the basis of
explicit cross-case investigation or on the basis of strong deductive hunches.
That is, we have reason to presume that a causal factor of interest (denoted
X1) is strongly associated with an outcome (Y), holding other factors (X2)
constant. In this context, the identification of a crucial case serves not to
confirm or disconfirm a causal hypothesis (because that hypothesis is already
well established) but rather to clarify a hypothesis. More specifically, the case
study serves to elucidate causal mechanisms” (Gerring, 2007, p.238).
Therefore, our case selection strategy di↵ers from the classical crucial case logic, which
serves as theory confirming or disconfirming logic (Eckstein, 1975; Levy, 2008; cfr. Flyvb-
jerg, 2006, p. 232). In a second step, we added France (2015-16), which is out-of-sample
since our dataset ends in 2004. We chose this case for three, mainly pragmatic, reasons
(Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p.295). We observed a striking co-variation in the inde-
pendent and dependent variable of interest but also that the ‘pushing’ mechanism did not
seem to be at play, since the military was very skeptical of their increased role. In our
research process for the present study, therefore, we delved into this case to find support
and better refine the ‘pulling’ mechanism. Second, the variation from the ‘baseline level
of involvement in politics’ was easier to identify, since we have already developed the
necessary background knowledge for conducting this in-depth case. Third, this instance
was more recent so it was easier to study both via news and report as well as well as
through interviews with key experts involved in the process.
We systematically collected primary and secondary sources, such as newspaper articles
and military magazines connecting terrorist threats or terrorist attacks with an increased
level of military involvement in politics in France (1995-98 and 2015-16) and Algeria
(1989-92). One of the authors of this manuscript is a specialist on French politics and is
fluent in French, allowing us to complement the primary and secondary sources written
material with five semi-structured individual qualitative interviews with experts in the
cases under study and military personnel of both the French and the Algeria militaries
(see list below). Sources have been used as evidence only when triangulated with other
sources and confirmed by our interviewees. The sources have been coded and analyzed
through standard text analysis. We provide further detail on the interview in the following
table.
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Table C1: List of interviewees
Interviewees Date Location Background
Expert 1 Jan-17 Paris Retired army general
Expert 2 Mar-17 Paris (via phone) On-duty French army colonel
Expert 4 Feb-17 Paris (via phone) Retired Algerian army colonel
Expert 5 Apr-17 Algiers (via phone) Academic, Algeria expert
Expert 6 Apr-17 Beirut (via phone) Academic, Algeria
Expert 7 Sep-17 Paris Academic, France expert
Expert 8 Oct-17 Paris (via phone) French Army colonel
Expert 9 May-18 Paris (via phone) Retired French general
Table C2: France: pushing (1995-98)
Country Year N. of Terrorist attacks (X) ICRG (Y)
France 1994 14 1.1
France 1995 39 1.1
France 1996 19 1.2
France 1997 44 1.9
France 1998 44 2.2
France 1999 42 2.2
France 2000 19 2.2
France 2001 17 2.2
France 2002 13 2.2
France 2003 32 2.2
France 2004 8 2.2
Table C3: Algeria: pushing (1989-92)
Country Year N. of Terrorist attacks (X) ICRG (Y)
Algeria 1988 0 4.2
Algeria 1989 0 4.2
Algeria 1990 3 4.2
Algeria 1991 31 5.3
Algeria 1992 215 6.2
Algeria 1993 107 6.2
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